The trust rule
This page lists what the spike program and the production program enforce, each measured on a local validator, and what the spike does not enforce.
Enforced in the spike
| Rule | How the program checks it | Test result |
|---|---|---|
| An exit pays only the key that signed it | Each exit must be preceded by an ed25519 verification instruction whose public key and message match the exit's address, amount, root and batch number; the payout account must equal that address | A settle carrying a forged signature was refused |
| Only the sequencer posts a settle | The signer must equal the sequencer key stored in the domain account | A settle signed by another key was refused |
| Each batch counts once | The signed message includes the batch number, and every settle moves it forward by one | Replaying a settle with an old batch number was refused |
| The vault is the domain's own | The vault address must equal the address derived from "vault" and the domain | Checked on every settle |
Enforced in the production program
The production program (engine-domain) passed 36 of 36 tests on a local validator, eight of them attacks.
| Rule | Test result |
|---|---|
| A member leaves by signing readable words: "Adytum exit", the domain, the amount in SOL and the batch number. The vault rebuilds that text and pays only the wallet whose key signed it | An exit signed by another key, for another domain or for an old batch was refused |
| The signature proof must sit inside its own instruction at the standard positions, so the bytes the program reads are the bytes that were signed | Two forged layouts were refused, including the one that emptied a vault in the first build |
| One exit per member per batch | The same signed exit placed twice in one batch was refused |
| Inactivity exit: each domain sets a window of N slots when it opens. If no settle lands for N slots, a member can withdraw without the sequencer, taking a balance the sequencer signed at the last batch, or the deposits they made since it | Withdrawal without the sequencer succeeded |
| Each receipt pays once per batch, and each deposit once | Second claims were refused, including after a fresh deposit |
| A member's receipt account cannot be closed while the domain runs, so its claim records cannot be reset | Closing it on an open domain was refused |
| The sequencer cannot settle until it has counted every inactivity exit the vault has paid | A settle with a stale count was refused |
| The inactivity exit is only for a silent domain | An active domain refused it |
| Exits pay only wallets that entered | A settle paying a wallet that never deposited into that domain was refused |
| The domain closes only when its vault holds no member money | Closing it with money inside was refused |
The sequencer follows two rules of its own, checked through the app on a local validator (51 of 51 checks passed):
- A deposit can be spent inside once the next batch settles, a few seconds later. Until then the vault would refund it through the inactivity exit, so it is not spendable twice.
- Balance receipts are signed at each settled batch. If anyone takes a receipt out of the vault, the private ledger returns to that batch, so transfers made after it are undone and the vault always holds what the ledger owes.
The sequencer can still hold the door shut by not posting settles. The inactivity exit is the way out when it does.
Not enforced on chain
- Balances are not checked on chain. The program does not compare an exit with what its owner deposited or holds inside the domain, because the inside balances live in the sequencer's encrypted ledger. A sequencer that also controls a member key could sign an exit larger than that member's balance. The guarantee today is the narrower rule above: an exit pays only the key that signed it.
- No exit without the sequencer in the spike. The spike has no inactivity exit; the production program above adds it.
- The sequencer is a plain key. In this build the sequencer is an ordinary keypair on our server.
On the roadmap
The sequencer moves into an attested hardware enclave, so the code that holds the room's keys can be checked.